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Pluralism, solidarism and the emergence of world society in 
English School theory.* 
Abstract 
This paper argues that the debate between pluralism and solidarism in English 
School theory has been cast in such a way as to hand the progressive cause to solidarism, 
taking for granted that moves towards the emergence of world society further a solidarist 
normative agenda. The paper suggests this is because of assumptions about the nature and 
location of such changes within English School theory. However, an alternative 
understanding of change, as emerging from tensions arising within the pluralist 
understanding of international society, has been overlooked. This enables a challenge to be 
raised to the assumption that world society must be solidarist, producing an initial defence 
of a potentially ethically desirable pluralist form of world society.  
Introduction 
This is a paper about conceptions of change in English School theory and, in 
particular, about the putative change from an international society of states to a world 
society of individuals. As such, it speaks to one of the most general issues in English School 
theory, arguably in any theory of international relations, how does change occur? It also, 
though, focuses upon one particular way that change towards world society is being 
considered: the normative desirability of this change, and the normative agenda assumed to 
be inherent within it. The paper develops an argument that solidarism may not be inherent 
in world society and that a pluralist world society is potentially ethically desirable. 
This introduction lays some groundwork for this discussion, looking at how both 
world society and change have been understood in the English School, and makes some 
initial claims about the way English School debates have tended to assume that solidarism is 
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‘hard-wired’ into world society. The paper then looks in more detail at the account of change 
from international to world society, before turning to pluralism in an effort to argue for its 
overlooked significance for the development of world society and its potentially ethically 
desirable contribution. 
Contemporary English School theorists are responding to challenges to state-
centricity in the conduct and theorisation of international relations via a new interest in the 
underdeveloped idea of world society.1 A part of this underdevelopment is definitional 
imprecision. One searches vainly for a clear, generally accepted definition such as those 
provided by Bull for an international system and an international society.2 Advancing such a 
definition is not the principal purpose of this paper, but offering a brief and reasonably 
precise definition will hopefully assist the argument I want to develop. Thus, world society is 
associated with a political system in which states are not the predominant actors, although 
this does not mean they disappear; where political activity is principally focused upon 
individuals, rather than institutionalised collectives; and where normative progress is 
understood in universal terms. These characteristics sum up key features of the idea of 
world society in a way that highlights its distinctiveness from an international society. 
Methodologically speaking, Richard Little has persuasively argued for adopting a different 
methodological approach to studying world society, via critical theory, and for the positive 
benefits of methodological pluralism.3 This further contributes to the distinctiveness of 
world society, pointing to the significance of the putative transformation. 
The challenge presented by the globalisation debates and the inadequacies of past 
English School efforts to deal with notions of interdependence and globalisation, exemplified 
by Hedley Bull’s distrustful dismissal, have made redressing this underdevelopment 
necessary.4 However, in addition to recognising a need, English School theorists have also 
seen an opportunity to reinvigorate a ‘solidarist’ or cosmopolitan normative agenda. This 
opportunity and agenda spring from one of the best known tensions within English School 
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theory – the pluralist vs. solidarist debate – and the way in which the development of the 
theory has associated pluralism with international society and solidarism with world society. 
Thus Martin Wight’s ‘three traditions’ of a Hobbesian ‘international system’, a Grotian 
‘international society’ and Kantian ‘world society’ have generated an expectation that issues 
of ethical diversity in international relations are best mediated within an international 
society.5 Hedley Bull’s work reinforced this by emphasising the need for order in conditions 
of both ethical diversity and political anarchy, and the consequent danger of pursuing 
cosmopolitan or universal ethical ideals in such circumstances.6  
João Almeida has argued that this picture is somewhat too simple. Instead, the 
realist/rationalist/revolutionist framework, developed through the work of the British 
Committee, was significantly driven by a desire to differentiate what we now know as 
English School theory from Realism.7 The historical emphasis of such work, challenging the 
Realist and neo-Realist argument for international relations as a pre-social condition or state 
of nature, argues Almeida, clearly makes such a distinction. More importantly here, though, 
it established an understanding of the international system that enables a clearer 
appreciation of the role that solidarist values and practices have played and do play in 
international politics. Almeida argues that, ‘the most valuable legacy of the British 
Committee lies in the possibility … to treat questions of power without falling into the realist 
position, and to study the impact of solidarism and humanitarianism on international society 
without linking it to a structural transformation towards a post-Westphalian political 
system.’8 This reinforces the English School’s recognition of the continuous interplay of 
elements of realism, rationalism and revolutionism by highlighting how a solidarism most 
strongly associated with world society plays an important role in international society, too. 
However, it underplays the significance of the development of world society and doesn’t 
discuss the role for pluralism within world society, something this paper aims to address. 
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Challenges to state-centrism via the emergence of conditions creating a meaningful 
universal human community sharing growing numbers of common concerns, practices and 
institutions enable solidarism’s universal ethical agenda to flourish. One early example of 
this is provided by John Vincent’s argument for a ‘basic rights’ approach.9 More recently, 
ideas coming out of the globalisation literature, such as ‘supra-territoriality’ and ‘globality’ 
that transcend the sovereign states-system and establish trans-national forces, communities 
and ideals are also indicative of this sort of transformation.10 Critiques of static notions of 
territoriality and ideas about new sorts of spaces in which politics can take place and where 
new sorts of communities can develop reinforce this sense that world society, and with it a 
solidarist normative agenda, is arriving.11  
The significance of this change is potentially enormous, but raises the issue of what 
constitutes change in English School theory. Whilst there is little specific discussion of this 
question in key English School texts, Bull’s account of the emergence of an international 
system offers us guidance for recognising change from an international society to a world 
society. Equally, we also need to remember that English School theory holds that elements 
of world society, as of international system and international society, are always present in 
international politics. Change is therefore a process, rather than being switch-like, and we 
need to look for growing evidence that alternative structural principles and normative 
visions are generating effects that cannot be contained within or co-opted by established, 
dominant practices and conceptualisations. Thus, parallel to the way that an international 
system emerges when states develop interactions significant enough that they have to take 
one another into account, change towards world society is occurring when established 
mechanisms and institutions of international society have to take into account processes, 
institutions and normative critiques rooted in global practices and conceptualisations. 
Importantly, this taking into account cannot occur through containment or co-option, but 
only via developing established institutions and practices, or introducing new ones, that 
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challenge the underpinning structural conceptualisation of an international society. Notions 
like ‘globality’, ‘supra-territoriality’ and cosmopolitan ethics do this, because they propose 
mechanisms, institutions, processes and ideals that are incompatible with the structural 
conceptualisation of an international society taking as its basic assumption ‘… the existence 
of states … each of which possesses and asserts sovereignty in relation to a portion of the 
earth’s surface and a particular segment of the human population.’12 
Exploring this account of change offers alternative normative conclusions about the 
nature of world society. By looking at the understanding of change supporting the idea that 
globalisation is bringing about a world society, and thus emphasising a solidarist normative 
agenda, the paper hopes to show that a pluralist world society is also a plausible and 
potentially desirable outcome. This is because of an overlooked, but important, source of 
change in international politics that lies within the way that international society manages 
ethical diversity.  
David Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah have made a strong case that the question of 
ethical diversity played a central role in the establishment of the sovereign states-system as 
an international society. Their main focus is the relationship of diversity to territory, and the 
territorialisation of diversity through the ideal of the sovereign nation-state. By this they 
mean that the profundity of the questions raised by, initially religious, diversity were 
ultimately unresolved at Westphalia. Instead, the problem of competing notions of divine 
truth, of the good life and of the moral standing of individuals of different faiths was 
enclosed or corralled within territorial borders. It would be a ‘domestic’ matter how such 
issues were dealt with, and that others ought to abstain from involving themselves in such 
debates. Although the form of both ethical diversity and the debates about it have changed 
over the intervening three and half centuries or so, this basic principle has endured. Blaney 
and Inayatullah describe this as ‘the Westphalian deferral’ of the diversity question.13 They 
argue that international society has never resolved the problem of how to live together in 
 6 
conditions of diversity and that the territorialisation of diversity was merely a way of putting 
to one side an intractable problem. The tractability of the issue may well not have improved, 
but the ability of international society to continue to operate as a successful deferring 
mechanism is in great doubt. Challenges to and debates over the ethical status of territorial 
borders as the boundaries of community are one good example of this strain.14  
Ethical diversity is central here because it raises the hardest questions for the 
English School, and others in IR, to attempt to answer. I take lack of agreement over the 
nature of the good life and the status of human beings, or even the possibility of such 
agreement, to be at the core of the idea of ethical diversity. For pluralists, like Bull, Jackson 
and Mayall, the absence, or even impossibility, of such agreement is central to their 
conservative defence of international society as normatively desirable, in line with the 
Westphalian deferral. On the other hand, solidarists, such as Vincent, Wheeler and Linklater, 
argue that the emergence of limited, universal ethical consensus is possible, desirable and 
even present on some questions, such as the moral outrage of genocide.15 The issue of 
ethical diversity, whether at the level of empirical debate or philosophical dispute, underpins 
the significance of the other forms of diversity in international relations, because it is 
through this debate that these forms acquire ethical force. Racial diversity, for example 
takes on such great international political significance only in the presence of racist notions 
about the unequal ethical status of different races; diversity of political form matters so 
much because of the idea of political systems as mechanisms for living the good life.  
The significance of change, and especially of change from a politics of international 
society to a politics of world society, is therefore immense. Understanding that change, 
exploring the mechanisms through which it is occurring and engaging in normative debate 
about the sort of future that may lie ahead of us is one of the most important and 
stimulating challenges facing international relations. The English School is well placed to 
make a contribution to this debate. 
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International society, world society and change 
The classic account of an international society within the English School remains 
Bull’s The Anarchical Society. One of the most interesting things about the book is that 
despite Bull’s rejection of the existence of any significant elements of world society at the 
time he was writing, he nevertheless devotes the final section of the book to a consideration 
of alternative structural arrangements of international relations.16 Bull’s account of non-
Westphalian forms carries with it an air of detached interest.17 These forms are interesting, 
but the impression is that Bull has no expectation of their coming to pass in any likely future 
or even that their supposed superiority to the existing international society was well 
grounded. He concludes his assessment of the critiques of international society on the basis 
of its supposed failure to generate peace and security, economic and social justice, and 
environmental sustainability by arguing that such goals are not necessarily precluded by the 
states-system.18 The dangers of aiming for something ‘better’ and ending up with something 
worse clearly concerned Bull.19 A global politics in a world society is thus rejected as being 
inappropriate due to the absence of any significant trends generating empirical facts to 
sustain world society and the debatable nature of claims that it would produce more 
effective and normatively superior approaches to significant political challenges. The 
occurrence of change is basically dismissed. 
Bull’s analysis unavoidably carries with it the imprint of its 1970s origins. However, 
his basic claims have endured in English School writing that has been sceptical about the 
possibility of transcending international society. The most comprehensive contemporary 
restatement of Bull’s argument comes in Robert Jackson’s The Global Covenant.20 He too 
defends the importance of the state and anarchical society in similar terms. World society is 
something of which we need to be suspicious because of the risks that its pursuit may create 
for the painfully built-up and relatively fragile structures of order that exist amongst states. 
The weakening of the non-intervention principle in pursuit of cosmopolitan normative goals, 
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such as the protection and promotion of human rights and democracy, risks conflict with 
states where such ideas are not accepted, or possibly even recognised and fully understood. 
The conservative needs of order should be placed above the pursuit of justice should that 
pursuit conflict with the core tenets of international society.21 
Bull and Jackson’s ‘classical pluralism’ ignores globalisation to an unjustifiable 
extent. For example, it takes territoriality as being a static notion focused on the bordered, 
sovereign space, within which power and authority are monopolised and centralised 
hierarchically, and beyond which power and authority are lacking in authoritative, 
institutional form.22 The problems of certain states, even those that have ‘failed’, are 
‘domestic’ matters. They are none of the concern of the wider international community of 
states, let alone a global humanitarian community, unless assistance is requested.23 Diversity 
is subsumed within this territorialisation of politics and identity, manifested in the national 
characters, ethical schemas and normative goals of the states.24 The conservative 
interpretation of colonial self-determination seemingly settled the identity issue in 
international society by corralling diversity within territorial borders,25 a strategy that has 
been prominent in international society since its inception in early modern Europe.26  
Change at the level of structural principles – territorial sovereignty and non-
intervention – and of normative orientation – maintaining relatively stable and predictable 
patterns of inter-state relations – is neither present to any great extent or desirable. Change 
at the level of how international society works does occur, though. Great powers rise and 
fall, wars are fought and the balance of power moves. Bull’s other institutions of 
international society – international law and diplomacy – also undergo development. 
Indeed, specific states may also come and go. World society, though, remains stymied. 
Highly durable notions of territoriality engendering anarchy combined with the condition of 
diversity make the transition to a world where a universal human community can flourish 
extremely unlikely. Factors seen by advocates of globalisation as bringing such change about 
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are rejected as possessing no genuinely transformative potential. Indeed, it is striking that 
the index to Jackson’s book contains no entries for ‘globalisation’, ‘global economy’, 
‘international economy’, ‘economics’ or any similar terms that attempt to capture the spirit 
of notions such as Scholte’s identification of non-territorial political space. Some sort of 
global revolution would seem likely to be the only way in which international society will be 
overturned, and then at the cost of massive disorder and destruction.27 
Whilst reluctant to recognise the power of potential global transformations and 
sceptical about a normative agenda championing them, both Bull and Jackson are 
committed to leaving some room, no matter how marginal, open to these ideas. The 
acceptance of Wight’s tripartite schema for international relations theory includes the 
constant presence of the revolutionist, world society tradition.28 Whilst Bull and Jackson, 
joined perhaps by James Mayall and Alan James,29 may stand at the far end of the 
continuum of English School theory in their rejection of world society as a significant 
empirical fact, plausible normative agenda or powerful transformatory dynamic, they have 
to accept its immanent potential.30  
Other theorists have seen far greater room for this immanent potential to gain 
purchase in international relations. This alternative response offers far more scope for 
engaging with change and offers a mechanism for exploring world society both as putative 
reality and as ethically desirable development. What we might call ‘constructivist solidarism’ 
also possesses deep roots in the English School tradition.  
The significance of a cosmopolitan world society, inspired by Wight’s reading of 
Kant, is stressed in this sort of work. One interface between world society and international 
society that has helped to drive forward solidarist ideas in English School thinking is the issue 
of humanitarian intervention. The solidarism inherent in the idea of humanitarianism has 
reinvigorated interest in a solidarist ethical agenda for English School theory.31  
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Humanitarian intervention connects to debates about the sources of change that 
may lead towards world society because of the way that it raises the political significance of 
a universal human community. For solidarists, such a community is based on claims that 
certain values and ideals, or rights and duties, either are or ought to be shared globally. Ian 
Clark has emphasised how the end of the Cold War reinforced liberal aspects of the 
legitimacy of international society, including notions of human rights and democracy, 
offering empirical support to what Bull, during the 1970s and 1980s, saw as purely 
normative propositions.32 Vincent’s notion of ‘basic rights’ has also seen empirical 
development over the last two decades or so via growing legal and political support.33 These 
have contributed to potential transformations in international rules and practices, such as 
humanitarian intervention, that, Clark suggests, are at odds with the pluralist ethos of the 
states-system as it developed during the rise, and especially the fall, of the European 
colonial empires.34 Humanitarian intervention is thus a practice and proposition that fulfils 
the criteria of change discussed above, and the controversy that it attracts is in part due to 
the difficulty of co-opting it into the existing model of an international society.35 
Humanitarian intervention also connects to debates about emerging global forces.36 
This is most notable in the case of the media and its role in raising the profile of such issues 
and providing the images and stories that have been used by national and trans-national 
pressure groups to press governments to respond.37 Thus global information and elements 
of a nascent global civil society are also involved in this effort to respond to not just 
appalling human suffering but also to taking English School theory in a more solidarist 
direction.  
A responsiveness to global ethical issues like humanitarian intervention and a 
willingness to engage with emerging global forms and forces, whether via ideas like global 
civil society or global commercial media operations, highlights one element of change. A 
second lies in the efforts to reformulate English School methodology in an explicitly 
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constructivist way, bringing English School theory into the social theoretic project, utilising 
the insights available within this broad framework in a number of ways.38 
Most importantly for constructivist solidarism is the stress upon the power of ideas 
and dialogue to fashion and re-fashion the understanding and appearance of international 
relations. English School theory has always stressed that international relations is made, 
rather than being given, and that ideas are an important part of this.39 However, 
constructivist solidarism latches on to the critical and transformative potential in this insight. 
Rather than regarding ideas as durable, productive of incremental change and constrained 
by certain basic, essentially material, facts about the world, they become more easily 
mutable. Constructivist solidarists revitalise the agenda for change through their re-
interpretation of the English School and their efforts to comprehend the opportunities for 
solidarism and to build them into a persuasive normative agenda that takes the possibility of 
world society, or at least elements of world society, seriously.  
The pluralist-solidarist stalemate thus seems to be broken, and in favour of 
solidarism. Constructivist solidarists are able to appeal to a powerful social theoretical 
tradition that maintains, and rejuvenates, the praxeological elements of the English School. 
Their approach enables theoretical and academic insight into key global issues like 
humanitarian intervention, whilst retaining policy relevance, and it delivers a plausible and 
progressive normative agenda.40 Its sensitivity to the globalisation debate, via its recognition 
of the role of the media and a nascent global civil society, are further benefits. Andrew 
Linklater has made the most of these through the utilisation of Habermasian critical theory 
as a way to place international and world society ideas within an agenda that is powerfully 
cosmopolitan in its ethical perspective, but that manages to retain considerable room for 
diversity.41  
There are discordant voices about the direction of recent developments in 
international politics, pointing to the potential for oppression and coercion. Ian Clark’s 
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concerns about humanitarian intervention being part of a re-legitimation of Western 
dominance offers one such interpretation.42 Tim Dunne offers an alternative reason for 
caution via worries about the prospect of hyperpower unilateralism threatening an 
international society that relies for its existence upon the commitment of the leading states 
of the day to shared understandings of the common good and certain basic institutions. The 
anti-hegemonial character of international society is threatened by an enforced hierarchy 
rooted in a unilateralist conception of interest appealing to a Hobbesian model of 
international politics.43 In such a climate, humanitarianism, as an example of cosmopolitan 
moral sentiment, risks becoming the hypocritical rhetorical window-dressing that Realists 
and other cynics have typically dismissed it as.  
The existence of a continuum from Linklater to Jackson, as part of a broad English 
School tradition, is perhaps not immediately obvious.44 Their shared characterisation of 
relations between states as being framed by rules, norms and principles of behaviour that 
grant it both pattern and a shared interest in order recognised as a common good is one 
area of common ground. However, the immanent potential for change from international 
society to world society that Jackson acknowledges, if resists, and that Linklater revels in and 
promotes offers a more important connection. I want to suggest that another significant link 
may lie in a shared, and problematic, understanding of how the change from international to 
world society occurs. The English School, whether in classical pluralist or constructivist 
solidarist guise, sees pressures towards world society as lying primarily outside of the core 
institutions of the international society of sovereign states, as Bull defined them.45 The 
centrality of diplomacy, international law, the balance of power, war and the Great Powers 
to our understanding of international relations is being challenged in a manner 
unprecedented in the history of the Wetsphalian system. 
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Diversity, change and world society 
It seems implausible to attempt to argue that the economic and technological 
transformations that receive the majority of attention in the debates about globalisation are 
unimportant. These possess a logic and momentum that is substantially outside of the 
institutions of international society. They are affecting the conduct of social, political and 
economic affairs, the ways we think about them, and our ideas about how the world ought 
to be. They are changing international politics, in the sense of change used in this paper, and 
they are doing it in ways that are exogenous to the institutions of international society that 
have generally served to prevent and contain such developments. 
There is, of course, a symbiosis between a globalising economic and technological 
system and the sovereign states-system because of the way that the states-system 
generates necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for large-scale, long-distance, trans-national 
economic activity.46 The ability of international society to generate order amongst states is 
of prime importance here, but the operation of institutions of international society, like 
diplomacy and international law, are generating new organisations, practices and normative 
propositions that are novel, in Westphalian terms. These threaten the underpinning 
structural conceptualisations of international society and appeal to a structural logic that lies 
outside of international society, justifying the idea of their being ‘exogenous’.  
Organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and the International Criminal 
Court, although requiring inter-state order and being created by states through diplomatic 
negotiation, represent incorporation into international society of a global logic that is 
exogenous to these structural conceptualisations. In particular, notions of universal crimes 
and criminal accountability on the one hand and of a global capitalist system on the other 
have not been co-opted into the logic of international society. That opposition to the ICC has 
made such great play of the potential challenge it represents to state sovereignty is 
indicative of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of seeing the ICC as just another international 
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legal body, like the ICJ. Anti-WTO protests, although hugely diverse in nature, have 
emphasised sovereignty and the idea of the WTO as relocating authority in an institution 
that operates on the basis of a different structural conceptualisation – that of capital and 
markets.  
Thus it is the underpinning structural conceptualisations of these elements of world 
society that explains their novelty and significance. The idea that globalisation is creating 
wholly new political locations is indicative of this, but is not as important on its own as is 
sometimes claimed. Scholte’s distinction, for example, between territoriality – the social 
geography of traditional international relations – and supraterritoriality – the social relations 
of an ongoing globalisation – is symptomatic. He chooses his examples carefully for his 
rhetorical questions about how we would define the territorial location of aspects of 
globalisation. It is indeed impossible to pinpoint, in terms of a GPS reference, Special 
Drawing Rights, the Rushdie affair, Elle magazine and karaoke.47 We might ask similar 
questions of international society, the balance of power, international law, great power, 
international order and diplomacy and get the same kinds of answers. The referent objects 
of such institutions, practices, goals and conventions might be, primarily, sovereign states, 
but the institutions, practices, goals and conventions themselves cannot be said to be 
enshrined in a specific territorial location. Thus Scholte’s portrayal of globality via 
supraterritoriality relies for its plausibility on a view of territorial international relations that 
assumes the international system is just an empty space within which states inter-, or 
possibly co-, act.48 The significance of Scholte’s examples lies less in their location and more 
in the challenges they symbolise to the structure of international society and the 
impossibility of co-opting them into or controlling them through the institutions of 
international society.  
Minimising the impact of change on the territorial system of international society 
has been one response to the ongoing economic, social, political and normative challenge of 
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globalisation. If, as Bull argued, the preservation of the states-system is the principal goal of 
international society, then this is perhaps hardly surprising.49 This should not blind us to an 
immanent source of change within the institutions of international society – the deferred 
problem of diversity. The conservatism of the pluralist stance can thus be explained in terms 
of resistance to this change. However, we can also see that this need not be the only 
response. The international society – world society link, the way in which international 
society contains elements of supraterritoriality, as well as providing the permissive 
conditions for the more familiar aspects of globalisation, highlights the way in which change 
is immanent. Indeed, a non-territorial world society may be better equipped to deal with 
diversity because it does not place such a great emphasis, or at least it need not, on 
corralling diversity into bordered territory. It is important to recognise, though, that the 
pressures operating here do not spring solely, or even necessarily principally, from the 
exogenous forces of globalisation.50  
State actors within international society have tended to respond to the pressures on 
the Westphalian deferral in ways that are consistent with the conservative portrayal of the 
pluralist strand of English School thinking.51 One of pluralism’s strengths is that it provides a 
persuasive and insightful analytical account of the political process. However, the normative 
agenda proposed by a constructivist solidarism makes critical assessment of these responses 
essential. A pluralist international society does not have to be hidebound by diplomatic 
custom and practice, and a territorialised understanding of identity and diversity.52 It often 
is, but there is immanent potential for other responses. By engaging more fully with social 
theory the English School can move away from an almost axiomatic stress on continuity and 
repetition to explore change and alternatives. Ivor Neumann makes a persuasive case for 
this kind of approach to studying diplomacy and it could apply with equal force to territorial 
borders.53 There is an opportunity to utilise the global space immanent in international 
society in ways that nevertheless respond to classical pluralism’s uncertainties about 
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solidarism, including the sense that diversity may actually be positively desirable as well as 
practically unavoidable.54 
A pluralist world society? 
The growing pressures that diversity is generating within international society are 
contributing to the emergence of world society, representing a source of change that is 
endogenous to the institutions of international society. This goes much further than creating 
a permissive environment for other forms of globalisation, particularly a global economy and 
developing global information networks.  
World society need not be cosmopolitan. A progressive world society agenda can be 
found within the pluralist strand of international society if it can be de-territorialised, at 
least in part. The ‘in part’ matters, though. ‘Globality’ is unlikely to ever exist alone, as 
Scholte acknowledges.55 Also, a pluralist agenda must retain, and indeed strengthen, its 
commitment to the desirability of a plurality of ethical systems, worldviews and 
understandings. This is not just a feature of the way the world is, it ought to be recognised 
as a desirable feature and that political arrangements and institutions should be moulded by 
the need to respect and protect diversity. A territorially differentiated global polity is one 
part of this, but pluralist English School thinking needs to accept that it is only one part of it 
and not retain an overly territorialised conception of diversity.  
A scaling back, then, and critique of the reification of territoriality in pluralist English 
School writings is necessary. One way of doing this is to put the horse back in front of the 
cart and recognise that diversity is the key issue here and not territory. It is not that 
territorialisation engenders diversity or has in some sense become prior to it. Instead, 
diversity has been corralled into a territorial form in the case of international relations and 
as part of the means for dealing with the special problems and circumstances that come 
with a constitution of international relations as an anarchically organised and territorialised 
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social activity. Diversity is not a product of the states-system, but a fundamental feature of 
the human condition.56  
But there are versions of diversity that are increasingly pressing against this 
territorialised form of it – groups, identities, constituencies and interests that cannot take a 
territorial form that makes them at least candidate members of international society. 
Women, indigenous peoples, Diaspora’s, religions, trades-unionists, environmentalists and 
many others are often cited as elements of the emerging global civil society that is the 
counterpart, and potential counterbalance, to the globalisation of capitalist market 
economies.57 They are not territorial in the way that states are and yet they are obviously 
signifiers of diversity, and also of the potential clashes of interests, values and world-views 
that have been previously contained within international society.  
For solidarists like Linklater, these groups contribute to the emerging debate about 
global ethics and are potential participants in the dialogues, debates and discussions that, 
under the right conditions, have the potential to generate a genuinely global dialogic ethic.58 
This diversity can be accommodated in world society and it is indeed the emergence of 
globality that brings with it the possibility of such an accommodation. 
However it is not obvious that world society necessarily has to take the 
cosmopolitan direction that Wight mapped out for it. If international society can continue to 
play the role of restraining the resort to force in world politics and establishing territorial 
spaces within which some forms of diversity can be secure and protected, then world society 
might also be divided in ways that protect other kinds of non-territorialisable identities. 
These divisions will not be territorial – there is no need to reproduce another deferral of the 
diversity issue in world politics – but divisions, some of them quite impenetrable to others, 
or at least portrayed as impenetrable, will emerge.  
As political geographers like Newman and Paasi have stressed, borders, particularly 
Westphalian-style territorial borders, are constructed and re-constructed in the search for 
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control and power. These are two features of politics that, even in world society, will 
endure, suggesting that borders of some sort will endure with them.59 Donnan and Wilson, 
from a more anthropological perspective, also point to the ubiquity of borders and division, 
suggesting that they will prove to be as inescapable, if not as territorial, in any likely human 
social and political constellation: ‘Borders are … meaning-making and meaning-carrying 
entities, parts of the cultural landscape…’60 George Simmel has reversed the usual view of 
borders in international relations, ‘The border is not a spatial fact with a sociological impact, 
but a sociological fact that shapes spatially.’61 This richer, social-political-cultural nexus that 
is tied up with borders shows a need for divisions and borders in human life that will 
continue. This is the case even in world society until such unlikely and distant time as a 
globally homogenous identity, culture and society has emerged and in such a way as to 
negate the issues of power and control. As Peter Mandaville argues in his survey of 
anthropological critiques of the territorial nation-state, political life exists across and 
between bordered states and in ways that challenge the territorialisation of politics, society 
and culture in fundamental ways.62 
World society, as an increasingly important element of the eternal triangle of English 
School understandings of the dynamics shaping the world, may be as amenable to a pluralist 
interpretation as a solidarist one. If borders are inescapable, diversity is taken to be a 
desirable aspect of human life and, in particular, that this diversity is not amenable to 
ultimate reconciliation, then world society may be the place in which that irreconcilability 
can nevertheless find constructive outlets.  
The role of international society is thus re-focused on Bull’s core elements of the 
restraint of violence, stability of possession, especially of territory, and generating respect 
for agreements among states. The first of these is especially important because of the 
conflictual potential that is present in diversity, especially radical diversity over the kind of 
fundamental ethical questions that international society has deferred for so long, such as 
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the moral status of persons and the nature of the good life. War is a poor answer to the 
problems posed by diversity and an established consensus that limits legitimate casus belli 
as far as possible is one of international society’s principal achievements. Similarly, the role 
of international society in establishing specific expectations regarding the stability of 
territorial possession contributes to the agenda of restraining violence and also recognises 
the importance of the territory-identity nexus driven forward by nationalism in international 
society.63  
World society, though, can be the place where expressions of identity that are not 
state-based can find expression and even some form of institutionalisation. The attainment 
of cultural autonomy, for example, requires much more than some form of virtual epistemic 
community, of course, but the opportunity to establish new sites and places of communal 
politics is present. It is also true that much of the power in the relations between 
communities of identity remains in the hands of states, but the ability of regimes to control 
the flow of information, and increasingly even of people, is not limitless. Thus, whilst the 
institutions of international society have generally treated individuals as, for example, 
objects rather than subjects of international law, world society’s re-conceptualisation of the 
nature of political space challenges the need to work through the state to achieve political 
significance. Operating outside, or beyond, the regulation of identity that the state 
represents massively increases the scope for expressions of difference to political effect. For 
example, the diasporic communities of the contenders in the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s 
made significant contributions to the political and military efforts of those fellow community 
members who were physically present and fighting. This is one instance of the way that even 
communities with powerful ideological ties to specific pieces of land can nevertheless 
nurture and politicise a sense of identity and belonging among those who may never have 
set foot on the supposedly sacred soil of a fetishised motherland.  
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Alongside this kind of activity, there are increasingly important political processes 
and pressures that do not take a geographically specific form and that do not appeal to the 
kind of community, like a nation, that is territorialisable. As well as the traditional target of 
state policy, they also aim to influence the policies, practices and development of the kind of 
institutions, such as the WTO or ICC, that are indicative of the force of exogenous change on 
international society. States may have the final say in the negotiation and framing of these 
bodies, but once in operation considerable control passes into the hands of people like the 
Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, who are charged with working on a global basis in pursuit of a 
global agenda symbolised by the phrase ‘crimes against humanity’. Whilst the ICC and its 
INGO advocates and supporters point to a cosmopolitan world society, the Balkan, and 
other, diasporas point to a pluralist one. The controversy over non-territorial religious 
communities, especially when they are significantly present in political systems that 
emphasise national citizenship and identity, is another example. The fierce debate over the 
status of the headscarf worn by some Muslim women in Western societies offers a public 
policy example of the complex and highly contested relationship between geographical 
residence, state citizenship, cultural ties to the land of one’s forebears and religious values. 
To whom is loyalty owed? Where is the site of authentic authority? How do we reconcile 
secular and religious imperatives? Where is the line between ‘private’ moral conviction and 
‘public’ political statement? These are all questions tied up in such a debate. The state is no 
longer the final arbiter on such matters and the political spaces and nascent institutions of 
world society are being used to bring pressure to bear. 
At an empirical level, therefore, the idea that it is solidarism that represents the 
‘authentic’ voice of world society may be difficult to sustain. Indeed, given the relatively 
limited number of members of international society it may be the case that solidarism is 
easier to attain here than in a babel-voiced world society.64 However, this does not address 
the normative question of whether or not solidarism ought to be the authentic voice of 
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world society. Powerful, critical approaches suggest that it is, with Linklater’s use of 
Habermasian Critical Theory leading the way. This generates a world society that is certainly 
characterised by the kind of non-territorialised form of politics we associate with world 
society. Instead it offers a form of politics that is characterised by a dialogue between 
different identities, communities and ethical schemas that, at least in ideal form, leads 
towards reconciliation and universality. 
If diversity is about a conversation or dialogue, then why this must necessarily be 
directed towards agreement or resolution of difference is unclear. Linklater offers good 
reasons as to why it might be and, in his view, ought to be, because of the ethical imperative 
of emancipation. However, it can be a dialogue about re-stating difference, about 
experiencing and encountering others whose ways of life we find inexplicable and even 
repugnant. Some societies and groups may reach out to others, attempting to learn from or 
comprehend those they find strange. Others may wish to use the condition of globality as a 
means for hiding, in a way that the cracks in the walls of non-intervention are making less 
viable in international society. Linklater’s scheme rules out this kind of approach to world 
society on principally philosophical grounds. Such behaviour does not conform to the rules 
of what counts as ‘communication’.  
Richard Shapcott uses Hans-Georg Gadamer as an alternative philosophical 
inspiration for creating a normative vision of a world society that, he argues, offers a 
superior means of generating certain basic solidarist values without coercively crushing 
difference. Once again, though, the philosophical premises about what counts as 
communication and the nature of human beings as communicating creatures establish 
powerful limits on what is and what is not admissible political debate and dialogue. 
Shapcott’s schema is somewhat less restrictive than Linklater’s but it does nevertheless rest 
upon an ultimately foundational claim about ethics that denies the authenticity of radical 
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difference on the basis that it is does not conform to an essentialised notion of 
communication. 
Taking diversity as being the starting place for ethics, though, offers an alternative 
ontology of difference that can inform a pluralist version of world society. Thus there is no 
need to justify it as being the outcome of dialogue rather than power, or as an acceptable 
alternative interpretation of notions of human rights. Diversity needs both protection and 
limitation, in particular from the violently imposed homogeneity that is a part of a 
Westphalian deferral that has enabled the repression and persecution of minority groups to 
take place behind the façade of sovereignty and non-intervention. World society is 
normatively desirable because it offers scope for the repressed and marginalised 
communities to find some form of political voice. Requiring that voice to accord with pre-
determined rules about what counts as authentic or admissible re-creates and re-locates 
some of the very repressive and discriminatory practices such groups may be seeking to 
escape.  
The normative character of a pluralist world society moves away from the dialogue, 
negotiation and pursuit of universal ethical community of either a Habermasian, 
Gadamerian or more straightforwardly rights-based cosmopolitanism. Instead virtues such 
as toleration and a self-critical open-mindedness are more prominent in normative accounts 
of what sort of world society it is desirable to see develop. These do not preclude the 
emergence of universal values or a universal community, but these ends become secondary, 
even providential, rather than being hard-wired into the normative agenda of world society. 
Thus a partly de-territorialised pluralist modus vivendi offers a normative agenda for 
world society. By predicating it upon a more deep-seated and fundamental diversity and 
need for community than that manifested in the sovereign states-system it may be able to 
more thoroughly address, rather than defer, the diversity issue. However, a pluralist world 
society must not be a free-for-all. It should not be an effort to enable violently intolerant 
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groups, identities and communities to find a new place in which to live and thrive. There are 
limits to a tolerable diversity and a need for order to enable meaningful social life to exist, as 
Bull pointed out, and that includes order within and between communities in world 
society.65  
There is, therefore, a need for world society to develop institutions that are able to 
restrain violently intolerant groups that threaten the normative potential of world society. 
This paper has argued that the efforts of states in international society to respond to the 
exogenous pressures of globalisation and cosmopolitan normative pressures have produced 
some such institutions. It has also pointed to the limitations of international society as a 
mechanism for addressing diversity as an endogenous source of world society. This, 
however, has yet to produce such distinctive institutional manifestations. The role of 
national and religious diasporas has been identified as one potential institution and the 
growing significance of trans-national networks of NGOs can also be mentioned, such as the 
loosely grouped anti-globalisation movement.  
This thin institutional beer may not be a sign of the paucity of the conception on 
offer, though. On the one hand we can point to the length of time that the institutions of 
international society have been evolving and contrast this with the novelty of the possibility 
of institutions of world society. More in tune with the normative thrust here, though, is the 
idea that the human action that is making world society is unpredictable in its intentions and 
outcomes, including institutional outcomes. As Ian Clark argues in relation to the end of the 
Cold War, the transformative intentions and effects of this shift in the international system 
also brought with it conservative, regressive measures. These entrenched existing sites and 
forms of power and authority in ways unintended by those driving forward the end of the 
Cold War.66 World society is subject to the same vagaries of action – it can just as well 
produce pluralist effects and dynamics as solidarist ones, even if these are not necessarily 
intended. Attempting to limit world society to an essentially solidarist form potentially 
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repeats the same error of a teleological reading of history that can be laid at the door of a 
classical pluralist like Jackson.67  
The unpredictability of a global politics that is predicated on diversity is one of the 
attractions of a pluralist world society. It has the potential to offer individuals and groups 
not just the comfort, safety and familiarity of their own communities, but the chance to step 
out into the world, to engage and act in a public way and on their own terms. This insertion 
of people and groups into world society is unlikely to be amenable to specific rules, forms 
and institutions of action. Instead, it carries with it an unpredictability of outcome that is 
exciting and, of course, occasionally dangerous.68 Solidarism recognises this, too, in its 
pursuit of principles and institutions that will minimise the unpredictable and dangerous 
consequences of diversity. Pluralism is more willing to pay the price of unpredictability in the 
name of giving scope to a far-wider range of communities to play a role in world society. 
Judging the costs and benefits of these two approaches is, ultimately, a pragmatic matter 
that seems ill suited to a priori philosophical resolution. Political ethics will, and ought to, 
remain contextual and circumstantial, as the English School has always argued. 
Conclusions 
The issue of change is of great importance to all I.R. theory. The English School, via 
the idea of interaction between realist, rationalist and revolutionist traditions of thought 
and action, has an in-built mechanism for addressing and explaining change. Constructivist 
solidarism is indicative of how English School theory can respond to issues such as 
globalisation, humanitarian intervention and challenges to its established understandings 
and concepts of territory. Efforts to take the English School in a more normatively 
cosmopolitan direction have produced substantial and innovative work that not only pushes 
forward a normative agenda, but offers real insight into major policy issues. The practical, 
and praxeological, strengths of English School thought are being reproduced.  
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However, this paper has suggested that this work relies too heavily on seeing the 
dynamics of change as exogenous to the institutions of international society. Instead, I have 
tried to map out developments within international society, focused on questions of 
diversity, that strain the fabric of international society, pushing towards a framework that is 
less constrained by a narrow and static notion of territoriality.  
Consideration of this tension offers an alternative to the solidarist interpretation of 
the outcome of global change. Instead, a preliminary defence has been developed of how 
and why a pluralist response to the opportunities and demands of globalisation may be 
made. This, too, seeks to offer a positive and progressive normative agenda, but one that 
emphasises the inescapability of diversity, rather than seeing it as part of the ‘second best’ 
world of an international society that is now in ever closer contact with the ideal of a world 
society.69  
Thus the pluralist-solidarist tension in English School theory, embodied in so many 
ways in the role and understanding of territory in international society, looks set to continue 
and, indeed, ought to continue. A vision of a pluralist ‘supraterritorial’ world society 
emerging in part through the economic, financial, social and political dynamics of 
globalisation and in part from within international society itself, offers a vibrant normative 
agenda to set alongside that of solidarism. Diversity may have been corralled within the 
territorial state, but the change signified by alternatively territorial or non-territorial forms 
of politics does not mean that diversity remains within the fences of the territorial borders 
of sovereign states. The identification of revolutionism with solidarism and the assumption 
that world society has to be solidarist has been taken too much for granted in English School 
thinking about change in international relations and the opportunities it presents. 
Recognising the depth of diversity in the human condition and its normative significance, 
appreciating its role in engendering change from within international society and appealing 
to a more open, fluid and dynamic vision of world society suggests there is plenty of 
 26 
potential left in pluralist thinking about change, and the outcome of change, in international 
relations.  
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